Indonesian Muslim Youth and the Discourse on the Caliphate System, Islamic State and Sharia-Based Regional Regulations in the Post-Reform Era

This study analyzes the discourse on the caliphate system, the Islamic state, and the Shariabased regional regulation among Indonesian Muslim youth. After the reform era, the large flow of Islamic studies and political discourse in Indonesia was marked by a big wave of return of Islamic conservatism. The discourse of jihad, caliphs, Sharia-based regional regulation, and the struggle to bring about an Islamic state became lively. This study focuses on millennial young Islamic activists' responses whose join public schools in Pekalongan City, Central Java, Indonesia. With a qualitative approach, this study's data were obtained through interviews, observation, and documentation. The data were analyzed through an interactive analysis tool introduced by Miles and Huberman. The results of this study reveal that Muslim youths have multiple personalities. They want to be entirely religious and apply Islam in all aspects. Still, they are also aware that a state based on Pancasila (Five principles) is the right choice in a pluralistic Indonesian context. This study also found that the majority of Indonesian youths had minimal literacy in the constituent debate on religious and state relations during the formation of the Indonesian state. This fact impacts the lack of awareness, understanding, and contextualization of the caliphate system's discourse, the Islamic state, and the Sharia regulation among Indonesian Muslim youth. On the other hand, the strengthening of textual understanding and the lack of awareness of nationalism literacy are the threat to the sustainability of the Indonesian nation’s future.


INTRODUCTION
Discourses on religion and the state experienced a new chapter after the fall of Soeharto and the end of the power of the New Order era in politics in Indonesia. This era was marked by the birth of a reformation government that upheld freedom of opinion, association and inclusivism of the interpretation of the Pancasila ideology (Steenbrink, 1999: 280-96), in addition to the emergence of separatist movements in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh (Aspinall & Berger, 2001: 1003-1024. The socio-political stability of the New Order era which was carried out through military power and repressive rulers, as well as the monopoly of truth in the interpretation of religious and state relations has ended. The reform era reopens sensitive discourses in the nation and state, which have been closed tightly by the government and tend to be on the contrary to the civilian forces (Feillard, 1997).
Debates over the state ideology, Pancasila, the caliphate system, the Islamic state, and the sharia state have flared up again during this period (Effendy, 2003;Salim, 2008;Baswedan, 2004: 669-690) ;Suharso, 2006;Berutu, 2020;Raillon, 2011: 92-113;Kersten, 2009: 971-985). The collective agreement of the "state ideology" has begun to be questioned. The reality of the diversity of ethnicities, languages, religions, and beliefs growing in harmony with one another in Indonesia is starting to be interrupted. Several groups began to appear carrying the spirit of radicalism, wanting to carry the caliphate state to replace the foundation of the state. They question again and even reject the ideology of Pancasila and ignore diversity (Maghfur & Muniroh, 2013: 181-195). At the same time, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (NIIS) caused shocks in various countries in the Middle East. The turmoil caused by ISIS even reached Indonesia.
The religious radicalism community tries to replace Pancasila ideology with a caliphate system and an Islamic state. These groups then viewed the form of government and ideology promoted by Indonesia as a wrong decision. Therefore, the system of government and ideology of Indonesia must be replaced by the caliphate's system and ideology. Thoughts and actions to change the ideology of this state have campaigned massively and systematically. Muslim youths began to be influenced by the idea of a ISSN: 1411-1632  transnational Islamic movement campaigning for the caliphate system. Psychologically, youth are in the process of searching for self-identity and the average age is around 16-35 years old (Sarwono, 2012). Textual and radical understanding of Islam will easily affect this group of adolescents because they have doubts, are disoriented, and are socially psychologically isolated from their society. The characteristics of adolescents closer to peergroups and tend to stay away from their parents make them quickly recruited into radical groups (Pristiani, & Lestari, 2019: 108-117;Mujahid, 2014).
This study seeks to re-question the research results revealed by Qodir (2016: 429-445) that currently there is a phenomenon of the emergence of views and actions of radicalism among Muslim youth. This phenomenon has emerged over the past five years with various events occurring. On the other hand, the study conducted by Steenbrink (1999: 280-96) regarding Pancasila as the state ideology and modern ideology for Indonesian Muslims shows the stages of acceptance, contestation and intense debate. As an ideology of state, Pancasila should be comprehend in a variety of ways (Suryadinata, 2018); it's just that the government has so far dominated and has a single authorization in interpreting Pancasila in the context of democracy and ideology (Morfit, 1981: 838-851;Ramage, 1997 As a government system, the Caliphate system also has various weaknesses. The first weakness is that the patterns and mechanisms for making the caliphate system open opportunities for leaders who do not meet the qualifications. The mechanism and implementation of bai'at process (pledging spiritual allegiance) is done by asking someone to pledge as a caliph. Bai'at process must be done based on the willingness and freedom of choice. The principle of willingness has an impact on a person's freedom to perform bai'at or not. Willingness in bai'at process shows that there should be no enforcement on someone to do bai'at and vice versa, should not force people to take Bai'at (Fitriono & Suhono, 2017: 43-55). This bai'at system is not a problem because according to the contract in Islam there is no force. However, don't be mistaken this is just the first process.
Meanwhile, after the appointment of a bai'at, it is permissible to force a person or group of people to bail out a caliph who has previously been bai'at the appointment. This second bai'at is called bai'at obedience.
The second weakness is that the head of state in the caliphate system has extensive powers. In several statements he said: "The Khilafah is the state itself," the legal and political consequences of this statement are that a leader is a state itself which has the right to perform the functions, authority and power of the state, both legislative, executive and judicial powers. The Caliph has the right to change and repeal laws if deemed necessary.
Not only that, the Caliph has the right to tabanni and issue the syara' laws which the public must obey. The Caliph is in charge of domestic and foreign politics, including determining and appointing state officials. In this context, the caliphate system contains controversies (Jaelani & Hum, 2015).
Second, the Islamic State. Islam is both religion and state. These two things cannot be separated. Religion contains all aspects of community life, be it religion, economy, politics or others. (Kamali & Kamali, 1993: 17-40). According to Baidhawy (2015), normatively, Islam does not have a concept that refers directly and denotatively to an Islamic state or state. In Islam, only ethical principles are found in forming a country, such as the values of justice, welfare and peace (Baidhawy, 2015: 41-57).
Historically, Muslims' lives have recognized the caliphate (state) and Imamat (government) concept and practice, and both are important public institutions in Islam.
The caliphate system is the mother of all institutions. The caliphate system is the implementation of Islamic law to achieve justice both individually and institutionally; Externally the caliphate system is also responsible for the welfare and peace of the people, as well as upholding a just and peaceful world order. The vision of the state found throughout the history of Islam includes: universal humanity and egalitarianism, moral totalism in all activities of the society, nation and state, upholding the independence, implementing education for all and life, pluralism that recognizes differences and diversity, and enforcing the rule of law (Al-Faruqi, 2001).
According to Osman (1983), he stated that Islam is only related to spiritual life, without any connection with society and the state. It maybe as far from the fact that Islam has provided a comprehensive and detailed social, economic and political system (Osman,  Third, Sharia-based regional regulation. Sharia-based regional regulations or those with sharia nuances color the life of the nation. Sharia-based regional regulations or regional regulation nuanced sharia is the term for regional laws in Indonesia based on Islam. Local governments set these regulations at the provincial, district and city levels. The emergence of Sharia-based regional regulations was motivated by the regional autonomy law, which allows regional governments to issue regional rules as long as they do not conflict with higher laws. Muhatada (2014) defines a sharia-based regional regulation as "any regulation issued by local governments that is directly or indirectly related, or at least considered related, to Islamic law or norms". The birth of the sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia impacts the government's decentralization program after the fall of the New Order regime. This decentralization policy provides more space for local governments to issue perda and other local regulations, including those with Islamic nuances (Hanum, 2017: 41-67).
Pros and cons have colored the rise of sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia. The debate over the Sharia-based regional regulation, both as a form of positivization and as a form of indigenization itself indicates that the meaning of shari'ah is obscured. Sharia, which is the law to enforce prohibitions and orders, is actually reduced by political power interests. Jati (2013) reveals that the Sharia-based regional regulation as a legal product is basically a political consensus product. This study also finds that behind the sharia-based regional regulations are political interests and only serve certain groups' interests. More than that, sharia is only used as an image tool for the government, to cover corruption cases, as well as a tool for public control. Besides, the sharia-based regional regulation also threatens community groups, such as non-Muslims, women, minorities, and other ethnic groups to become vulnerable groups who are victimized in implementing the sharia perda (Jati, 2013: 305-318).
According to Dani Muhtada, the sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia can be categorized into seven. First, local regulations related to morality, such as those on alcoholic drinking, gambling, prohibition of alcoholic beverages, prostitution, or pornography. Second, local regulations related to philanthropic issues, such as zakat, infaq, and shadaqah policies. Third, local regulations related to Islamic education. This includes the regional regulation on madrasah diniyah and reading and writing the Koran. Regional regulations in this category, for example, regulations on grand mosques, haj services, and reception of Ramadan (Muhtada, 2014).
The Perspective of Millennial Muslim views on the Caliphate System, Islamic State and Sharia-based Regional Regulations.
This section discusses the responses of young Muslim activists to the caliphate system's widespread discourse, the Islamic state and the sharia-based regional regulation in post-reform Indonesia. Today, the discourse of implementing a caliphate system and an Muslim youths in Pekalongan stated that in the context of Indonesia's current nationality, campaigning for the caliphate system is an outdated idea (interview with Freeddy, 20 July 2019). The caliphate system is an ancient discourse that those who take advantage of religious issues are trying to bring back political interests. Due to this fact, Freddy rejected the caliphate system, an Islamic state with all its derivatives, including the sharia-based regional regulation and efforts to formalize Islam in Indonesia. The argument used by Freddy is the context of locality, culture and values adopted by the Indonesian people.
Lufaefi (2017) states that the caliphate system will not be enforced to be implemented in Indonesia. Text interpretation about politics and government must be based on social reality. In the history of the administration of Islamic governance and Islamic ideology as applied by the Prophet Muhammad SAW in Arabic, it is very different from the pluralistic Indonesian background (Lufaefi, 2017: 73-90).
Freddy's response and thought received support from his mentor, Taufik, a spiritual coach at a high school. According to Taufik, the caliphate system was constitutionally rejected by itself. However, in the context of the sharia-based regional regulation, Taufik can still consider and accommodate the sharia-based regional regulation, as long as it is carried out through a valid mechanism. Taufik gives an example of a case in Aceh (Berutu, AG (2020 (Prawiranegara, 1984: 74-83).
It is undeniable that although the caliphate system and the Islamic state are considered dangerous for the unity of Indonesia, as well as deny mutual agreement, parties always appear to try to change Pancasila as the state ideology by bringing up the issue of religion for political, economic and global trade (Rudnyckyj, 2010: 189-220).
Taufik, that millennial Muslim youth, considers that the caliphate system is the romanticism of Muslims, which does not suit a pluralistic Indonesian nation's needs.
Responding to the discourse on the caliphate system, Taufik prioritized the integrity of the nation and state. Having a commitment to keep the unity of the state is more important above else. For him, the caliphate system, Imamat and the Islamic State had no place in Indonesia, and from the beginning, this had been an agreement with the nation's founding fathers. Taufik countered the rise of the caliphate system jargon as a solution to the nation's problems, by saying: "I personally interpret the caliphate as a" substitute ", however, if the meaning of the caliphate is interpreted as a leader that must be implemented in Indonesia, I will disagree. Because we are a country that adheres to the Pancasila constitution. Pancasila is final. Without Pancasila, the Republic of Indonesia will collapse" (Taufiq, 2019).
The responses of the mentors of religious activities in secondary schools suggest the view that the caliphate is not always appropriate. For Taufik, if the caliphate system is implemented in Indonesia it is not only unsuitable, but also denies mutual agreement. For him, Pancasila as the basis of the state requires that all state affairs must have a constitutional basis and Pancasila is the nation's highest consensus that has been mutually agreed upon. Pancasila is based on cultural, social and religious values, and serves as the unifier for Indonesia's diversity (Fitch & Webb, 1989: 44-51). Vol. 24 No. 1 April 2021 In line with Taufik's views, Freddy, a young religious activist, considers that the caliphate system is irrelevant for the Indonesian nation. Freddy vulgarly thinks that the caliphate system is an outdated issue. Freddy has the view that "from a conceptual perspective, the caliphate system is a post-Prophet government system. I think the issue of the caliphate system in government is outdated. So it would be good if the Indonesian state still has its process. It has its own history, and Pancasila is the right one. " (Interview with Freddy, 20 August 2019).

RELIGIA
Thus, the caliphate system and the Islamic state were considered by young Islamic activists to be unsuitable for the Indonesian state's needs. Indonesia as a plural country, has a variety of cultures, social and religious values, the presence of a certain religion-based ideology will hurt the feelings of other groups.

Controversy over the Sharia-based Regional Regulation and the Formalization of Islam
So, what is the response of research subjects related to the widespread discourse of Sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia. To answer this question, Taufik said: "Sharia-based regional regulations is totally fine and that is the authority and policy of regional autonomy. As an example in Aceh. However, these regulations only apply to certain violations. So the criminal and civil government laws need to be implemented." Nadia, a young Muslim activist, argues: "Sharia-based regional regulations are the implementation of laws in every region by using Islamic laws, such as in Aceh. Sharia-based regional regulations is more appropriate for an Islamic country. An Islamic state is a country that follows and implements the rules of Islamic law as a guideline for governance. … If every country applies Islamic law, surely the society or the state will have peace" (Interview with Nadia, 21 August 2019).
Nadia's view indicates that the discourse on Sharia-based regional regulations in the Indonesian state system is still pros and cons. This controversial debate can be seen in the study conducted by Suharso (2006: 305-308), both the process and implementation (Abrori, 2016: 71-88). According to Abrori, matters related to sharia, although theologically a reference to the truth, but its juridical position in national law. The implementation of sharia-based regional regulation is still being debated. The existence of sharia-based regional regulations has been a dilemma both in terms of concept and implementation. It became a controversial discourse (Alim, 2010: 119-142). Many people consider that the sharia-based regional regulations are unnecessary. However, there are also those who consider that sharia-based regional regulations are important in maintaining public morals.
Even so, legally formal sharia-based regional regulation does not apply constitutionally, but its existence is still maintained until now. The sharia-based regional regulations are in fact very political, not for the sake of upholding social order. The position of the sharia-based regional regulations in regional autonomy in Indonesia is only a political tool to attract public support for political parties, not the aspirations of the people (Suharso, 2006: 305-308).
In contrast to Nadia, Freddy clearly rejected the issue of the sharia regulations. "For an Islamic state to be implemented in Indonesia, I don't think it is suitable, because pluralism consists of various ethnicities, customs and religions. I think the foundation of our Indonesian state Pancasila has provided good teachings. Related to the punishment of flogging, stoning and so on, it does not have to be enforced only in Arab (Islamic countries). The existing regulation in Aceh like flogging punishment for those who are dating, I think it can be applied in Indonesia, because it will provide a very high deterrent effect. Thus, the existing laws in Indonesia can be collaborated. So it doesn't have to be an Islamic state, the law can be implemented in a country with a scheme. We see the fact that if there is no deterrent effect, the corruptors and criminals will not feel guilty" (Interview with Taufik, 20 August 2019).
Based on the explanation above, Taufik considers that the enforcement of Islamic law is not relevant to be implemented in Indonesia for constitutional reasons. However,

Taufik opened up opportunities for collaboration between Islamic values and national
regulations. According to him, one of the "privileges" of Islamic law is that it has a RELIGIA Vol.  (Hafidhuddin, 2000: 181). Even though Islam is a constructive value in the state, Nadia emphasized that Islamic laws are not appropriate in the name of religious diversity and diversity. Nadia explained the following.
"If the Islamic law is like that, It is actually fine, because it will provide lessons and proportional punishment. Society became deterrent. But in Indonesia it is not easy to implement because the country adheres to many religions. So practice in the field becomes difficult, not to mention that the economy in Indonesia that has been controlled by non-Muslims" (Interview with Nadia, 25 July 2019).
Nadia's words above indicate that Islamic law is considered good, because it provides a learning and deterrent effect. However, although it is considered good, Islamic law in Indonesia is not acceptable and difficult to apply for the reasons of the constitution and religious pluralism. The majority of Muslims are not automatically allowed to impose the majority's tyrannical will (Nurrohman Syarif, 2012: 79-92). Muslims also need to develop a tolerant attitude towards other groups (Auliya, Abubakar & Maliki, (2019: 127-136 his view by referring to the history of several positive legal regulations. Following is Taufik's response: "…Since 1971 there has been a formalization of law No. 1 of 1974 (Marriage Law) that regulates marriage in Indonesia, and it becomes the official state law. Including waqf law. In Indonesia, there are also religious courts that regulate such matters. So, It is probably impossible if it is implemented directly, but it will do gradually. It is because in the past, there was a history of one party that disagreed (PDI). They are worried that Indonesia will become an Islamic state. However, it has not been proven until now and instead regulates people's lives in marriage, etc." (Interview with Taufik, 21 August 2019).
Taufik said that there are actually many state laws as a result of "formalization." Taufik gave examples of regulations on marriage, religious courts, and waqf law. For Taufik, the regulatory process is indirectly carried out through official stages by the authorities.
Meanwhile, for Nadia, formalization can be done for a country with readiness, infrastructure, and human resources. However, what is meant by "readiness" , Nadia did not give further explanation. However, Nadia's view can be explained in the following figures. Nadia said, "If it is formalized in countries that are ready to be based on Islamic law, there is no problem. Islam is a religion that contains and is oriented towards productive and constructive practice. If Indonesia wants to be like that, there is no problem, and it will be better" (Interview with Nadia, 21 August 2019). It all depends on political decisions. Ironically, politicians only use religion as a cover to maintain power and influence. Religion is only used as an instrument to gain and maintain power. Politicians should have a strong character to create a just and civilized social order. According to Didin, Islamic politicians and politics should not only talk about power and position but also as a negotiation space for Islamic values to become the basis for managing all aspects of life and impacting the benefit of Muslims. In this context, placing Muslims as leaders becomes urgent to defend Muslims' interests (Hafidhuddin, 2001: 181).
As for Nadia, he thinks that the sharia regulation is not a problem for a country based on religion. However, in the Indonesian context, it is not suitable and difficult to implement. Based on the data above, in general, millennial Muslim activists reject the caliphate system, enforcement of Islamic sharia and the formalization of Islam. They Vol. 24 No. 1 April 2021 argued that Indonesia was not a country based on Islam, but Pancasila, with a multireligious socio-religious structure. Lufaefi (2017) examines the urgency of reconstructing the thought of formalizing Islamic law and the future of Indonesia. The formalization of Islamic law offered by Islamic fundamentalist groups as a solution to various problems faced by the citizens needs to be contextualized with the reality of Indonesia as a plural country. This study reveals that the formalization of Islamic laws is not a solution (Lufaefi, 2017: 73-90).

RELIGIA
Regarding the implementation of the caliphate system, Fathan and Intan reject the caliphate system in Indonesia. According to them, the caliphate system does not have a constitutional and social basis. Fathan said that if the caliphate system is implemented in a culturally and religiously pluralistic Indonesia, it will only generate resistance from various society elements. Sharia-based regional regulations discourse also does not need to be formulated, let alone enforced in various regions. Sharia-based regional regulations are not Muslim youth are inconsistent in the way and mechanism of determining it. This fact can be traced from their response to the discourse on the formalization of Islam. For example, Fikri and Rikza are inconsistent with their views. Fikri supports the implementation of Islamic law, but he rejects Islam's formalization process in the constitution. In contrast to Rikza, he agreed with Islam's formalization, even though he had previously rejected actions related to upholding Islamic law. In this context, Fikri and Rikza are inconsistent with their views, choices, and arguments. In a general perspective, if someone thinks it is necessary to uphold Islamic law, the formalization of Islam is also given priority. Vice versa, unlike Fikri and Rikza, Khalimah is consistent in her view that this religious activist agrees with the mechanism for the formalization of Islam. However, she is still doubtful about its implementation. Khalimah's doubts regarding the formation of the Sharia-based regional regulation and its implementation are reasonable because it has shown problems, challenges, and obstacles in several studies. Abrori (2016) in his research in Garut, West Java, confirmed the conditions that hinder the implementation of Islamic law (Abrori, ISSN: 1411-1632  2016: 71-88). Thus, the establishment and implementation of Sharia regulation at the field level will experience its difficulties.
Thus, the majority of millennial Muslim activists reject the discourse of the shariabased regional regulations and the formalization of Islam. Only a few support and approve the sharia-based regional regulations and the formalization of Islam. The rejection of sharia regulation is parallel to the thinking of liberals and moderates in religion. Those who agree with the idea usually have a textual 'formalist' understanding and emphasize symbols and formality in religion. However, a few are concerned about the opinion that Islam or Sharia can be performed in the life of the nation. Although the majority rejects the caliphate system's existence, Islamic state, and the Sharia regulation, their defense is very vulnerable and shallow. Campaigns carried out by the radicals and fundamental Islam, supported by ideology, a systematic supply of literacy and propaganda, will weaken millennial generation nationalism. At this point, strengthening nationalism literacy, understanding moderate Islam, and multicultural awareness becomes an urgent agenda for stakeholders.