



## BACK-TO-ISLAM VERSUS ISLAMIC MODERATION MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA



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**Kastolani**

kastolani@iainsalatiga.ac.id

IAIN Salatiga

**Munajat**

munajatstain@gmail.com

IAIN Salatiga

**Abdullah Yusof**

Abdy@um.edu.my

Malaya University Malaysia

### Abstract

The present study to analyze the social activities of the fundamentalist movements in contrast to those of the moderate Islamic movement in Indonesia. It focusses on two groups in Salatiga Central Java: the Hati Beriman Foundation and the Khadijah Volunteer representing the fundamentalist groups, which they call themselves as the Back-to-Islam movement, and the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) representing the moderate groups. By observing the activities of those groups and interviewing their key activists, the study investigates their constations and why the Back-to-Islam group has gained more popularity to te public rather than those of the moderate groups. The results show that that the emergence of Back-to-Islam movements marks a new contestation between Muslim fundamentalism and moderate Muslims in Indonesia. Previously, the contestation focused on debates around the meaning of Islamic texts or teachings, but now it moves forward to get more Muslim sympathy in general. Moreover, that transition arises because of the political defeat of Muslim fundamentalist groups in upholding Islamic law (sharia). Besides, the transition occurred because fundamentalist Muslim groups considered that Muslims in Indonesia were experiencing pressure through radical stigma and terrorism.

**Keywords:** Back-to-Islam, Islamic moderation, Fundamentalism, and Moderate.

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### Abstrak

*Kajian ini menganalisis aktivitas sosial dari gerakan fundamentalis yang berkontestasi dengan gerakan Islam moderat di Indonesia. Kajian ini memfokuskan pada dua kelompok organisasi keagamaan di Salatiga Jawa Tengah: Yayasan Hati Beriman dan Relawan Khadijah yang mewakili kelompok fundamentalis, yang mereka menyebutnya sebagai gerakan Back-to-Islam, serta Muhammadiyah dan Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) mewakili kelompok moderat. Dengan*

*melakukan observasi perhadapan aktivitas kelompok tersebut dan wawancara terhadap para pengurus inti mereka, studi ini menyelidiki persaingan antar kelompok tersebut dan mengapa kelompok Back-to-Islam lebih populer di masyarakat daripada kelompok moderat. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa munculnya gerakan Back-to-Islam menandai kontestasi baru antara fundamentalisme Muslim dan Muslim moderat di Indonesia. Sebelumnya, kontestasi terfokus pada perdebatan seputar makna teks atau ajaran Islam, namun kini bergerak maju untuk mendapatkan simpati umat Islam secara umum. Transisi itu muncul karena kekalahan politik kelompok fundamentalis Muslim dalam menegakkan hukum Islam (syariah). Selain itu, transisi tersebut terjadi karena kelompok Muslim fundamentalis menilai umat Islam di Indonesia mengalami tekanan melalui stigma radikal dan terorisme.*

**Kata Kunci:** Kembali-ke-Islam, Islam moderat, fundamentalisme dan moderat

## A. INTRODUCTION

Islam is only one, religious understanding and practice among adherents take many forms. In the field of Islamic law, the diversity of understanding arises in the form of a madhhab of fiqh which regulates its adherents in carrying out worship (Naim, 2009, pp. 51–72; Randeree, 2013, pp. 19–27). In this context, differences are a blessing for Muslims in carrying out their religious teachings. Besides, these differences are internal (personal) because it is limited to only regulating the practice of teachings in Islamic law for Muslims themselves.

The practice of implementing Islamic sharia for Muslims is confronted with a government system in a single state political administration system, especially in a country with a majority Muslim population such as Indonesia, it often causes problems. For example, does the country (government) give freedom to every Muslim in carrying out the sharia? Problems also often arise when the practice of implementing Islamic law for Muslims is faced with being in the context of relations with groups of followers of other religions. For example, can those who have different religions from Islam be considered infidels?

The implementation of Islamic law and the relations between Muslims, as the majorities, and non-Muslims, as the minorities, in Indonesia have recently attracted the attention of some scholars such as Feally and Riccy (2019), Ula, Mashuri & Zaduqisti (Ula et al., 2017), Widiyanto (2016), Abdul Azim (2019) and Eisenberg, Sallquist & French (2009). Muslim groups who want to apply Islamic sharia law in a positive legal system, then they appear in extreme form by taking violent steps. The violence appears in the form of verbal in a variety of speeches that contain hatred and even physical violence. The display of various forms of violence presents Islam in Indonesia as extremism, radicalism, and even terrorism (A'la, 2008, p. 268; Baharuddin, 2019, p. 60; Fealy, 2004, p. 104; Mubarok & Hamid, 2018, p. 29). Several countries especially those with a majority Muslim population, extremism, radicalism, and terrorism movements advocate or take steps outside the norm, especially in political and religious relations (Scham, 2018, p. 26; Schmid, 2017, pp. 1–28). In addition to extremism, radicalism, and terrorism in Islam, there are also Referring to Schmid (2017, p. 19) the fundamentalist movements in Islam are not all extremists, radicals, and terrorists but all extremists, radicals, and terrorists are fundamentalists. Islamic fundamentalists believe that God is the ultimate authority in everything, including political life.

Referring to Bhala (2016), literal and restrictive interpretations of Islamic texts, without moderate interpretations, have dominated the juridical systems of Islamic countries. In Indonesia, this extremist, radical, or terrorist movement has been opposed by other Muslim groups who want Islam to be more moderate. Moderate Muslim groups oppose extreme views and actions, especially in political relations and religion, and are generally more receptive to change. But unlike the extremists, the Back-to-Islam movement does not have the power to fight for Islamic law. Politically, they fight for Islamic law through political parties, and culturally this group struggles through Islamic pulpits such as religious studies, syariah wedding organizers, radio, and festivals.

Important concept in this research, the Islamic moderate groups and the Back-to-Islam group are then put in the context of contestation. The contestation in this research can be understood as a struggle, debate, or contradiction with something that creates a clash of arguments. In this context, there is an exchange of arguments for accepting or rejecting certain things and debating certain things and agreeing to them (Vancil, 1998). That particular things are in the form of religious understanding, perspective, or religious behavior. With this background, the formulation of the problem of this research is the contestation between Islamic moderation and Back-to-Islam movement in Salatiga, and why the Back-to-Islam group has gained more popularity to the public rather than those of the moderate groups. The present study is a filed research in Salatiga. In order to collect data, the researchers observed activities of those two groups, namely the Khadijah Voluteer on one hand and Muhammadiyah and NU on the other hand. Besides, the researchers interviewed six activists of those organisations. Subsequently, The data is analyzed to describe the contestation of the Back-to-Islam movement and the moderat Islamic groups.

## **B. DISCUSSION**

### **1. Islamic Moderation and Islamic Fundamentalism**

Islamization of economy is a form or a way to Islamize economic activities that are based on Islamic principles. Economic activities that are based on Islamic principles, thus, are named Islamic economy. Economy itself is the study of human activities related to the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. The use of the term *Islamic economy* is basically to distinguish it from conventional economy. In this sense, Islamic economy tries to reconcile spiritual matters with worldly affairs, where Islamic economy acts as a filter of access to capitalism (Langton et al., 2011, p. 192).

There are two important concepts in the context of this study, namely Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic moderation. These two concepts came to be known as fundamentalist Muslims and moderate Muslims. Referring to Shahrur (2005, pp. 37–39), in the modern world, Islamic fundamentalism emerged after the Arab-Israeli war began in 1967. The war pushed Muslim groups to find their way back to fundamental Islamic principles. Fundamentalist Muslims understands strictly the text of the Qur'an and the Hadith which results in adjudication to all their actions. At the same time, the development of the world is experiencing modernity. Therefore, the way they understand the Qur'an and the Hadith textually is difficult to deal with contextual changes that are happening in the flow of modernity.

The dynamics of modernity which is quite rapid, various ideas emerge such as human rights, gender equality, or democracy. This idea was considered not Islamic teachings when the Qur'an was revealed (Zakaria, 2004, pp. 13–15). As a result, fundamentalist Muslim groups often reject new interpretations of the Holy Qur'an. Conversely, fundamentalist Muslims prefer reading that is centered on monotheism or divinely based government (Moussalli, 2013, p. 67). Fundamentalist Muslim groups

believe that humans cannot force the system of government that they set up to regulate life without involving God through sharia law.

Islamic law is believed to be applied so as to guarantee human welfare and avoid human misery. The basis of the implementation of sharia law is monotheism which binds all aspects of human life. Therefore, fundamentalist Muslims believe that monotheism can dominate all human life, including in the government system. That is why according to Moussalli (2013), in politics, fundamentalist Muslims have a revolutionary doctrine against laws that are not following the principle of monotheism. At the most extreme level, all the rules or institutions carried out by modern or secular authorities are considered to violate God's divine principle.

A system of government, for fundamentalist Muslims, must be managed according to God's will, not personally compiled by humans. Therefore, the revolution is believed to be the responsibility to reject the government system that is organized but not according to God's will. In practice, Muslim fundamentalists then oppose anyone they consider to interfere with the management or governance of a state that is not based on monotheism or divine government. God is the source of all laws, and everything in society must demand obedience man to God. Extremist fundamentalists even reject dialogue and compromise with different people (Hilālī et al., 2000, p. 78). An important figure of influential fundamentalist Muslims as a political movement in the world is Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt through his provocative statement that "It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to rule, to apply its law to all countries and expand its power to the whole planet" (Esposito, 2005, pp. 11–20).

Islamic fundamentalism in the form of extremists and radicals arose because, in the Qur'an and Hadith, violence is justified (Baharuddin, 2019, pp. 58–59; Schmid, 2017, p. 25), such as said Al-Qur'an, At-Taubah (9): 5), or Al-Qur'an, Al-Anfal (8): 12). Yet in the Qur'an, there are some verses that prohibit killing, for example, said in Al-Quran, Al Isra (17): 33 or Al-Quran, Al Maidah (5): 32. Both of them—the verses that contain violence and peace are part of Islam. In this perspective, Islamic moderation appears as a middle way that bridges the understanding of fundamentalist Muslims and moderates Muslims.

Islamic Moderation in various works of literature is known as wasatiyyah Islam, meaning that Islam is central, or in the middle, not fundamentalism or secularism (Khatib, 2014, pp. 23–25). The term Islamic moderation can also refer to the term *umatan washatan* in Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 143. According to Kamal Hassan (2015, pp. 41–57), *umatan wasatan* refers to a universal community or Muslim community that has the attribute of justice, excellence, and a balance that can be trusted by God in this world and the hereafter. Places the position of Islamic moderation in the context of political and social change and how Muslims interpret Islam in that context (Khan, 2005, pp. 39–50). According to Cohen (Cohen, 2005, p. 10), Esposito (2005, p. 20), and Fuller (2005, p. 28) provide a modern understanding of moderate Muslims as non-violent Muslims, tolerant Muslims, pro-democracy Muslims, and Muslims who accept a level of secularism.

Thus, in my opinion, the term Islamic moderation is in the context of global socio-politics as a response or reaction to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, especially those present in the form of absolutism, extremism, radicalism, and even more terrorism. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalism also appears in the context of political and religious relations in global dynamics. As part of a global society, the actions of fundamentalist

Muslims who are present to fight for Islamic law in the form of extremism, radicalism and even more terrorism certainly also obtain a reaction from the global community.

A consequence, Islamic moderation is often used by the global community to serve different global political interests. The term Islamic moderation tends to commit to religious secularism while Muslim fundamentalists or Islamic fundamentalism or absolutism are committed to the establishment of sharia law. In this understanding, both Islamic moderation and Islamic fundamentalism are ideologies in understanding Islam (Bilgrami, 1992, pp. 829–835). Islamic moderation is a gradual transformation of core values and beliefs in rigid Islam to be flexible and tolerant (Tallmeister, 2013, pp. 1–6). But because of this understanding, asserts that Islamic moderation must refer to one's intellectual position, not their political position. Khan explains that Islamic moderation is reflective, self-critical, pro-democracy and pro-human rights, and secularists (Khan, 2005, pp. 39–40). Therefore, Islamic moderation differs from radical Muslims in their methods and basic openness to interpretations of Islam in the modern world. One of the most prominent sectors of the different interpretations of Islam in the modern world is the enforcement of sharia law. In this sector, in a broader context, problems can arise when the practice of carrying out Islamic law or beliefs among Muslims is in a broader global context such as democracy, human rights, tolerance, or justice.

A broader global context, Islam often appears in violence as a form of terrorism. Terrorism is then often understood as a form of religious radicalism that emerged from religious fundamentalism. Thus, terrorism seems to be at the bottom of the radicalism movement while at the upstream is religious fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalism can be put on one side facing religious liberalism on the other side. In contrast to religious fundamentalism which understands Islam in a lethal (textual) manner, religious liberalism offers ideas that rely on freedom in understanding religious texts based on diverse contexts (Massad, 2016, p. 172).

The Indonesian context, the struggle to enforce sharia law is very board, especially since President Soeharto ceased from his presidency of the Republic of Indonesia in 1998. Referring to Salim (2016, pp. 21–30), during 2000-2001, the National Assembly (DPR) rejected many proposals from several Islamic political parties who wanted the implementation of Islamic law. Hefner (2011, p. 213) describes groups who want the application of Islamic law as an Islamic group. This Islamic group is a new category in the Indonesian contexts which ideologically refers to Islamic fundamentalism. The magnitude desire of fundamentalist Islamic groups to implement Islamic law increased the reaction in the birth of the Liberal Islam group through the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) organization.

Liberal Islam itself is a concept that is still new and often debated. This concept arises in the context of modernity to reject a blind understanding and obedience to religious (Islamic) doctrine. The term liberal Islam first appeared through Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzeed (2008) in *A Modern Approach to Islam*. Fyzeed strongly encourages a critical reinterpretation and re-examination of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence to make them relevant to contemporary modern life. In the Indonesian context, liberal Islamic groups refer to this JIL facing each other with fundamentalist (Islamic) groups that refer to HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), and MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council).

According to Hefner (2011, pp. 59–66), efforts to implement Islamic law in Indonesia by fundamentalist groups (Islamist) failed not because of the emergence of JIL, but because most Muslims residing NU and Muhammadiyah did not provide support.

Therefore, in the context of contemporary Indonesia today, I think NU and Muhammadiyah are groups promote Islamic moderation, while HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), and MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council) are groups that promote Back-to-Islam movements. While in a historical perspective, moderate Islam in Indonesia can also refer to the process of islamization of the archipelago through peaceful means, not conquest or war to replace the pre-existing religions (Madjid, 1995, p. 92).

## **2. Islamic Moderation, the Middle Way Against Religious Fundamentalism**

One of the characteristics of fundamentalism in religion (Islam) is a strong desire to implement Islamic law in the life of the nation and state. Referring to Ilya Muhsin (20 February 2020), sharia law cannot be used as a positive law governing all citizens including non-Muslims, except for specially regulated areas such as Aceh. This desire to make Islamic law a positive law has been seen emerged since in the early days of Indonesian independence. This means Indonesia has an Islamic gene, besides the nationalist gene. Thus, indeed this pluralistic Islamic moderation in Indonesia is very relevant.

The political movement to implement Islamic law first appeared in the Indonesian Investigation Preparatory Agency (Noer, 1980, p. 320). According to Nastiti and Ratri (2018, p. 202), the desire to re-apply Islamic law emerged from political parties, especially after the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. This desire was seen in various Regional Regulations known as Sharia Regulations. Recorded at least 160 Sharia Regulations at the Regency level. But strangely, political parties that wanted the enactment of Islamic law were not gaining a big vote in the General Election. The oddity was explained as a form of secular democracy (Mujani & Liddle, 2009, pp. 580–583). Secular democracy explains that in elections, the people of Indonesia are rational voters. They choose political parties based on programs offered by political parties participating in the election. That is why in other parts Islamic political parties that offer Islamic Sharia enforcement programs have never been able to win a greater voice than the nationalist political parties (Mujani & Liddle, 2007, pp. 840–845).

Referring to Hamayotsu (n.d., pp. 971–972), in the early days of its establishment, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) was an Islamic political party in Indonesia that wanted to apply the application of Islamic law through the Sharia Regulations. PKS is an Islamic party inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Machmudi (2008) explains, to win a bigger voice, in 2011 PKS expanded its voter segment by starting to consider the style of Nationalist Islam and accommodating the state or other political forces.

Assesses these changes as a form of political moderation (Tomsa, 2012, pp. 491–492). That is, the political moderation was chosen as a PKS political strategy to expand voters but still in the will to fight for the enactment of Islamic law. This political moderation is not a linear process but is positive for democratization in Indonesia. PKS has made adjustments to radicalism in Islam rather effectively, though this ideological adjustment will hurt the party (Bubalo et al., 2008, pp. 175–177). However, the desire to implement Islamic law not only arises through parliamentary political movements but also becomes an agenda for extreme fundamentalist Islamic organizations such as the Laskar Jihad, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and Muslim Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) that still want the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia.

According to Benny Ridwan (23 February 2020), agendas of extreme fundamentalist Islamic organizations still want the implementation of Islamic law (sharia) in Indonesia through various strategies accepted by the Muslim majority. He said: “The

reason why Muslims are the majority in Indonesia is only a sociological argument confronted to legitimize the narrow ideological interests, namely implementing Islamic law in Indonesia. Ideologically, Indonesia is a country based on almighty Godhead, but Indonesia is not an Islamic". Islam which was introduced only as sharia in Indonesia and presented it to the nation has indeed become a large-scale social tension. This tension during the colonial period even led to rebellion and war against the local Dutch government in Indonesia (van Dijk, 1984, pp. 15–18). Tensions had occurred during the Dutch colonial period in West Sumatra (Salim, 2016, p. 222).

The reappearance of the Islamic fundamentalism movement, for this reason, that wants to implement sharia law in Indonesia can be interpreted as a repetition of similar movements in the period before the independence of Indonesia and during the early days of independence through debate in the BPUPKI session. The movement has resurfaced because of the open democratic situation which is adopted by Indonesia (M. Ilya, personal communication, 20 February 2020). However, the current movement has been influenced by international networks. Back-to-Islam's activities can be interpreted as the softest renewal of the strategy of groups that carry the Islamic Khilafah and sharia to influence a wider Muslim audience. Benny said "The activities of Back-to-Islam did not appear suddenly. It was initiated with the religious material study that promotes Islamic sharia or who have associations towards it such as encouragement to hijra. Personal hijra starts from changing lifestyles, if it is strong and big then people will be invited to do communal hijra, social hijra to political hijra.

### **3. Living by Syariah Law: A Way Back to Islam.**

Back-to-Islam activity is a reflection of the condition of Muslims in the world who are experiencing various pressures and political injustice (Power, 2018, pp. 307–312). Back-to-Islam movement is a form of reflection on the condition of contemporary Muslims in Indonesia. In another part, there is a condition where globally Muslims are confronted with the pace of modernity, which results in various pressures and dilemmas (Bahroni, personal communication, January 2020). For example, a Muslim woman wants to keep her private parts covered, but she also wants to look fashionable (Beta, 2014, pp. 385–389). Another example is where a Muslim wants to run the Islamic sharia by avoiding riba but he or she wants to continue working at a banking company that practices riba.

The various conditions that are pressuring and dilemmatic encouraged the emergence of the hijra movement. Hijra originally referred to the event of the migration (migration) of the Prophet Muhammad SAW from Mecca to Medina because of religious orders and duties. In Medina, Rasulullah Muhammad SAW then began to build a new order of tolerant society (Uberman & Shay, 2016, pp. 16–20). The big event is now interpreted as a process of religious conversion of someone from a life that is not following Islamic teachings to a life that is following Islamic teachings.

The phenomenon of hijra cannot be separated from the rise of Islamic circles delivered by popular preachers and scholars, such as Abdul Somad, Hanan Ataqqi, Adi Hidayat, Khalid Basalamah, Aam Amiruddin, Mamah Dedeh, and so on through various new media channels such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and various other social media channels. This hijra phenomenon is becoming more widespread because it is done by some celebrities such as Laudya Cyntia Bella, Kartika Putri, Arie Untung, Sakti Sheila On7, or Uki Peterpan. The phenomenon of hijra by celebrities is called as micro-celebrities because they have the characteristics of young, Muslim, dare to hijra, and popular. The micro-celebrities have the ability and knowledge of the Islamic religion, as well as the support of social media accounts in the name of hijra. After doing the hijra,

the celebrities also often provide khutbah, especially to tell their experiences of doing hijra. The emergence of hijra phenomenon done by celebrities and religious teachers will make the religious circles becoming more entertaining and enjoyable.

Back-to-Islam activities are indeed designed as fun and entertaining religious activities without reducing the religious message to be conveyed. After that, unknowingly Muslims experience an increase in faith, an increase in solidarity, and practicing Islamic law in all of one's lives (kaffah). This process is what we call hijra. Hijra becomes a verb that means returning to the teachings of Islam, not moving or switching to the teachings of Islam. It means referring back to the teachings of Islam because someone has been a Muslim for so long, yet he has not practiced the teachings of Islam. Islamic teachings specifically refer to sharia law. Hijra is a route to become a Muslim that is kaffah. Therefore, I believe that the activities of Muslim United are chosen to enforce sharia with the goal of Muslims as personal, not state as institutional. Enforcement of Islamic law (sharia) is the final destination. This strategy avoids confrontational violence, upheaval, resistance, or politics that confront each other, especially between Islamic fundamentalism and state politics. This strategy chooses the path of popular culture through Islamic fashion, Islamic cuisine, Islamic travel, and recitation with actual themes that suit to millennial characteristics (Yuliatin, personal communication, 17 February 2020).

Detouring strategy is different from the previous strategy in the early reformation that led Indonesia to an open democratic situation. In that phase, the struggle to uphold Islamic law was pursued through political channels via Islamic parties by producing the sharia law. This route was considered a failure because it risked becoming a threat to national divisions and received resistance from nationalist groups. This detouring strategy is different from the strategy in the early days of independence which wanted Islamic law to be included in the item of Pancasila which is the basis of the state. This detouring strategy also differs greatly from the methods of violence adopted by some fundamentalist, because this strategy not only plays this part but sneaks in and rides on popular cultural trends. This argument, it can be assumed that Back-to-Islam activities do not appear in a vacuum. Even though it is only religious activities, Back-to-Islam activities have an ideological mission to uphold Islamic law. In other words, the activities of Back-to-Islam are a strategic response to the failure of Muslim political fundamentalism in its efforts to uphold Islamic sharia in Indonesia. I think as a political strategy to uphold Islamic law, the activities of Back-to-Islam are relatively successful in attracting broad public attention and generating new enthusiasm among fundamentalist Muslims to unite. The spirit is like an expression that wants to be shown openly because Muslims are currently in a position of distress because of the stigma of radical and terrorist. This religious group considers President Jokowi to have criminalized their clerics (Pradipta, 2018, pp. 119–121).

The activities of Back-to-Islam can also be interpreted as a form of diverting the arena from political theological debate on popular culture generated by new media. Fundamentalist Muslim groups make good use of the presence of new media not to serve the ideological debate of liberal Muslim groups and moderate Muslims. The presence of new media is used to foster awareness of Muslims (as netizens, individuals who are active in social media) Back-to-Islamic law (sharia). By using several celebrities, through activities on social media, the theme of hijra is spread. The hijra movement then accumulated into inner power and emerged into the activities of Back-to-Islam. Therefore, choosing the name of the activity as Back-to-Islam is also a strategy to ride

the millennial segment to be targeted. The use of ‘Back-to-Islam’ term (not the Arabic term) can also be interpreted as a strategy. Previously, fundamentalist Muslim groups often used Arabic terms such as hijra, ta’aruf, antum, akhwan, akhwat, kaffah, tasamuh, and others.

The use of foreign terms instead of the term Islam is intended to attract the attention of urban millennial Muslim groups. The choice of this segment is also a strategic choice because urban Muslims have better access to information, education, economics, and politics (Yuliatin, personal communication, 17 February 2020). The various conditions of the Muslim community which are suppressed by various radical or terrorist stigmas, in the short term, Back-to-Islam activities can become channels for hard-liner fundamentalist Muslim groups. That is, hard-liner fundamentalist Muslim groups still need a place to channel their ideological beliefs that are under pressure. Therefore, in the long run, Back-to-Islam becomes an arena of ideological struggle among fellow Muslim fundamentalists between religious fundamentalism with violence and religious fundamentalism without violence.

## CONCLUSION

Two important issues raised in the present study that the emergence of Back-to-Islam movements marks a new contestation between Muslim fundamentalism and moderate Muslims in Indonesia. Previously, the contestation focused on debates around the meaning of Islamic texts or teachings, but now it moves forward to get more Muslim sympathy in general. If previously the battle had taken place in the political arena and discourse, Muslim fundamentalism wanted the implementation of sharia through political activities. The second that transition arises because of the political defeat of Muslim fundamentalist groups in upholding Islamic law (sharia). Besides, the transition occurred because fundamentalist Muslim groups considered that Muslims in Indonesia were experiencing pressure through radical stigma and terrorism. Therefore, this research may have implications for new relations and contestation between Islamic fundamentalist groups with moderate Muslim groups. This study recommends to analyze the impacts of this new contestation in social and political aspects. It is because both of these movements have different ultimate goals and interpretations, which is to uphold Islamic law (sharia) in Indonesia.

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